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This paper  estimates  the  intergenerational  transmission  of  trust  by  studying  children  of
immigrants  in  29 European  countries  with  ancestry  in  87  nations.  There  is signiﬁcant  trans-
mission  of  trust  on the  mother’s  side,  and the  transmission  is signiﬁcantly  stronger  than
on  the  father’s  side.  The  transmission  is stronger  in high  trust  countries.  Building  trust  in
high trust  environments  is  a process  lasting  generations.  Intriguingly,  trust  transmission  is
strong also  in  low  trust  birth countries  if ancestral  trust  is very  high. There  is persistence  of
very  high  trust  in low  trusting  environments  through  cultural  transmission  in  the  family.
© 2014  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
. Introduction
Trust has been shown to correlate with favorable economic outcomes (Knack and Keefer, 1997) and with indicators of
ood government (La Porta et al., 1997, 1999) in cross country data. Recent papers examine the inﬂuence of trust on outcomes
y instrumental variables within countries. The focus has been on historical political institutions that transmit trust, which
n turn affect income (Tabellini, 2008, 2010) and social capital (Guiso et al., 2008). Algan and Cahuc (2010) use the trust
easures of different waves of immigrants to the U.S. to obtain a measure of how trust has changed over time, which they
egress on growth to estimate an effect of trust on growth across countries. The evidence points to an important role for
rust in economic and social development, but the knowledge of how trust is formed at the micro level is limited.Intergenerational transmission of trust in the family is examined by Dohmen et al. (2012) using a survey in Germany
hat samples both parents and their adult children. They ﬁnd strong positive correlations between the parents’ and their
hildren’s trust attitudes, which is consistent with a causal effect of parental trust on children’s trust. To address potential
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concerns about reverse causality they apply an instrumental variables approach. However, as pointed out by the authors,
the results should only be seen as suggestive of a causal effect due to a lack of good instruments.
The objective is to build on this work and provide an estimate of the intergenerational transmission of trust using a
different method; a method with a stronger claim to estimating a causal effect. This paper studies how second generation
immigrants’ trust are affected by the average level of trust in the parent’s birth country. This approach avoids the reverse
causality issue. To measure parental trust the average level of trust in the parent’s birth country is used. This parental trust
measure is not inﬂuenced by the trust of the child, who  is born in and resides in a different country.
Some evidence of intergenerational transmission of trust among immigrants is given by Guiso et al. (2006). They regress
trust on ancestry country or region ﬁxed effects for immigrants in the US. The ﬁxed effects would not only directly capture
the cultural inﬂuence of trust from the country of ancestry but also other aspects of cultural transmission. They ﬁnd that the
average level of trust in 14 immigrant groups is correlated with average trust in the corresponding countries. In a regression
analysis of immigrants in the U.S. Algan and Cahuc (2010) ﬁnd that trust is signiﬁcantly related to trust in their ancestral
country. They consider immigrants from 24, primarily European, countries.1
The current literature has not considered the intergenerational transmission of trust in a broad range of countries, nor has
it considered individuals from a wide set of backgrounds. This paper adds to the literature on intergenerational transmission
of trust in several ways. First, the paper studies individuals who reside in 29 European countries, which display a rich
variation in the institutional and cultural environment individuals’ face. Such variation increases the validity of the results
as immigrants to the U.S. could be particular and the results in that environment may  not generalize. Second, I consider
immigrants from 87 countries of ancestry which include not only Europe but also a wide range of countries in Africa,
the Americas, and Asia. By decreasing the reliance on immigrants from one region, Europe, which could be different from
individuals in other regions, my  results can address if Algan and Cahuc’s (2010) are general or speciﬁc to European immigrants
in the U.S.
Third, heterogeneity of the intergenerational transmission of trust is examined. This paper studies if the transmission is
stronger on the mother’s compared to the father’s side, and if it is stronger for individuals residing in high trust countries or
for those with high trust ancestral roots. It is also examined if certain individual characteristics, such as being more integrated
or having a highly educated mother, are associated with different inﬂuences of ancestral trust. The current literature has not
addressed the heterogeneity of the intergenerational transmission. The heterogeneity estimates provide evidence on which
channels are stronger and what the complementary inﬂuences are.
Fourth, this paper studies a determinant of trust in the ancestral country. The factor examined is language structure, in
particular if pronoun drop is allowed and if there is second person pronoun differentiation (such as Tu-Vous in French).
These linguistic features may  indicate different levels of respect for the individual, which in turn may  affect trust.2 While the
regressions of second generation immigrants provide a natural experiment in itself, they take the trust level of the ancestral
country as given. The objective of using language structure is to understand some deep roots of what drives trust in the
ancestral country.3 The second step is to use the part of the ancestral country trust that is shifted by the language structure
and relate it to the individual trust of the children of immigrants. This approach combines two  distinct methods in the
literature in a novel way.
Trust expressed by children of immigrants is on average similar to the general population, although this similarity in
means masks systematic differences across ancestries.4 The paper presents evidence of signiﬁcant cultural transmission
of trust, which is strongest on the mother’s side. Individuals whose mothers have high trust ancestry express signiﬁcantly
higher trust than others. There is also evidence of intriguing heterogeneity, where the inﬂuence is signiﬁcantly stronger on
the mother’s compared to the father’s side. Moreover, the transmission seems much more persistent in certain contexts. The
transmission is strong for individuals born and residing in high trusting countries such as Northern Europe and weaker in
low trusting environments such as Southern Europe. The ﬁndings are consistent with individuals who adjust quickly to the
lower trust levels in Southern and Eastern Europe, no matter their ancestry. Adapting to the higher trust in Northern Europe
is a long process as captured by the intergenerational transmission estimates.5 The evidence ﬁts with previous ﬁndings that
social capital can depreciate quickly, but it takes a long time to build.6
Intriguingly, when high ancestral trust is restricted to include only countries with very high trust the transmission in
this group is signiﬁcant also in low trust birth countries. This indicates a strong persistence of trust at very high levels also
in environments which may  not reinforce high trusting beliefs per se. The result suggests a mechanism for the persistence
of high trust societies and a non-linearity in the beneﬁts of promoting trust to very high levels, as very high trust may  be
robust to perturbations in the environment because of strong transmission in the family.
The study of trust formation at the individual level in this paper is also important because directly related work ﬁnds that
higher trust promotes economic success, information technology adoption, and health of individuals (Ljunge, 2012a, 2013a,
1 Tabellini (2008) presents similar evidence on immigrants in the U.S. from 21, primarily European, countries. Also see Uslaner (2008) on immigrants in
the  U.S. from 9 regions. Moschion and Tabasso (2013) study the U.S. and Australia.
2 These features have been used in the literature to address different questions in cross-country analysis, see Licht et al (2007) and Tabellini (2008).
3 Similar in spirit is Durante (2010) who  uses weather patterns as shifters of risk sharing institutions.
4 Children of immigrants and second generation immigrants are terms used interchangeably in this paper.
5 As an example, the share of the population in Sweden who say that most people can be trusted is twice that of Italy.
6 See for example Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
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014a). Butler et al. (2011) argues that very high trusting individuals get cheated and have lower income. However, Ljunge
2014a) do not reject that more trust is better for economic outcomes.
Is the transmission of trust optimal? Although more work needs to be done to understand the effects of trust, most of
he literature argues that more trust is better. In this view the cultural transmission of trust could be seen as sub-optimal
n two respects. First, individuals from low trust environments do not fully adapt to the trust in high trust environments.
econd, individuals from high trust environments adapt too much to the trust in low trust environments.
The approach of regressing individual outcomes on ancestral country values, labeled the epidemiological approach in
ernandez (2010), has been used to examine a range of questions.7 Studies using variants of this strategy have found strong
ffects of cultural traits in explaining aspects of women’s labor supply and fertility (see e.g., Guinnane et al., 2006; Alesina
nd Giuliano, 2010; Fernández and Fogli, 2006, 2009), and youth employment and mobility (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010).
ost evidence has been based on immigrants to the U.S. A few recent papers use data from a broad range of European
ountries to study motivation behind political participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) and preferences for redistribution
Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). The same data, the European Social Survey, is at the core of the analysis in this paper. Trust
mong ﬁrst generation immigrants in Europe is examined by Dinesen (2013). He takes a different approach by using cross
ountry variation to estimate effects of residence country institutions. This paper follows the approach in the economics
iterature and use within country variation.8
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical speciﬁcation, followed by the description
f the data in Section 3. The results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
. Empirical speciﬁcation
The analysis is based on a number of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form:9
Trusticat = ˇ0 + ˇ1Mean Trusta + ˇ2Xicat + ct + εicat (1)
rusticat captures the trust of individual i, born and residing in country c with a parent born in country a, and a /= c, in
eriod t. The average level of trust is common to all individuals with a parent born in country a. Xicat captures individual
emographic and economic controls that may  affect trust. The country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effect ct captures all the
nobserved factors that may  affect trust differentially across countries and time, and εicat is the error term. All standard
rrors allow for clustering by the parent’s birth country.
The advantage of this empirical model, over the analysis in for example Dohmen et al. (2012), is that the parental trust
easure is not endogenous to individual i’s trust. One concern when studying self-reported trust of both the child and the
arent, as in the aforementioned paper, is for example that an adverse experience of the child reduces his trust. As the child
nd the parent are in contact the child’s lower trust (and/or his adverse experience) could affect the parent to reduce his trust,
hich results in a positive correlation between the child’s and the parent’s trust. This potential reverse causality is avoided
y measuring parental trust by ancestral country trust. A signiﬁcant estimate of ˇ1 would hence indicate an impact of the
rust in the country of ancestry on the individual’s trust and not the other way around. Reverse causality is not a concern
ince the trust of a child born and residing in country c cannot affect the average value of trust in the parent’s birth country
. Confounding factors are of course a concern so it is important to include an extensive list of individual controls in Xicat,
hich is done. The inclusion of the country ﬁxed effect ct means that the institutional structure and all other unobserved
ifferences which apply to all residents in country c in period t are accounted for. It also means that the variation used is
o compare the outcomes of second generation immigrants within each country of residence relative to the traits in their
ountries of ancestry.10 The country ﬁxed effect is included for each year, which controls for non-linear trends that may
iffer across countries.
Moreover, the empirical approach produces a conservative estimate of ˇ1. The underlying model would be that the
arent’s individual trust would affect the child’s trust, but the average trust in the parent’s birth country is used as a measure
hat is not inﬂuenced by the child’s trust.11 Since there is substantial variation of parents’ individual trust levels in a population
he average level of the trust in the parent’s birth country, the variable Mean Trusta in the analysis, is not perfectly related
o the parent’s individual trust. This produces an attenuation bias in the method, biasing the estimate of ˇ1 toward zero. The
stimate of ˇ1 is hence conservative, and ﬁnding a signiﬁcant effect in spite of this bias would indicate strong evidence that
he effect is present.
It is worth mentioning that the trust of ﬁrst generation immigrants is strongly related to trust in their ancestral countries.
lthough trust of the second generation immigrants’ parents is not available in the data, the ﬁrst generation immigrants
7 Fernandez (2010) presents a detailed discussion of the approach as well as an extensive survey of papers applying the approach.
8 Dinesen (2013) uses a random effects model with very different interpretation from the ﬁxed effect model used in this paper. Furthermore, this paper
akes weaker assumptions on the error terms. I allow for arbitrary correlations among individuals with the same ancestry where the random effects model
ssumes independence.
9 The results are robust to using the ordered logit or the ordered probit estimator.
10 For example, I am comparing if individuals with high trusting Swedish ancestry born in Germany have higher trust than those born in Germany with
ower  trusting Italian ancestry.
11 Parental trust is not observed in the used data.
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may  stand as the “synthetic” parents. It is reassuring that the relationship holds also in the ﬁrst generation sample, which
supports the premise that ancestral country trust is a measure of parental trust.
Trust is not only determined by the cultural environment but also by institutions, as discussed by Guiso et al. (2006). The
approach in this paper singles out the cultural component of trust and its transmission in the family. The second generation
immigrant is inﬂuenced by the cultural and institutional environment where he is born and resides. In addition, he may
be inﬂuenced by the socialization through the immigrant parents. The parental inﬂuence is restricted to the cultural part
since the child is separated from the institutions of the parent’s birth country. The parents inﬂuence the child through
direct vertical socialization as modeled by Bisin and Verdier (2001). Since the child of an immigrant is not subjected to
the institutional environment of the ancestral country he is not subject to the same horizontal cultural transmission as his
parents. If there is a complementarity between direct and vertical transmission, the study of children of immigrants may
fail to detect the cultural transmission although it is there. In this sense the estimate of the direct cultural transmission is
biased toward zero, and hence conservative.
3. Data
The European Social Survey (ESS) is the main data set. The survey is administered biannually, starting in year 2002, in a
wide range of European countries. The survey covers a broad range of questions on social, political, and economic conditions,
as well as demographic variables.12
One essential feature of the data is that the survey asks about the country of birth of the respondent as well as the country
of birth of both parents. Data from the second to ﬁfth rounds of the ESS are used since the ﬁrst round does not include
information on parental birth country. The information allows me  to identify children of immigrants and which countries
their parents originate from. Looking at many countries of residence for second generation immigrants, 29 countries are
studied, reduces the concern that the results are driven by conditions of one particular country. Individuals with ancestry
from a wide range of countries are observed, up to 87 countries across the world, that reduce the concern that the results
are particular to a small number of ancestral backgrounds.
Several samples are studied. The focus is on the immigrant mother sample. This sample is deﬁned by the surveyed
individual being born in the country of residence but that the mother is born in a different country. The father could be
an immigrant or a native of the child’s birth country. In addition, the immigrant father sample is studied. It is deﬁned
correspondingly; the respondent is born in the country of residence and the father in another country (the mother could be
an immigrant or a native).13 In the case an individual’s both parents are immigrants he is included in both samples.14
The summary statistics are presented in Table A1. The countries participating in the ESS in each round are presented in
Table A2.
3.1. Individual trust
Individual trust is measured with the following question in the ESS: “Using this card, generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me  on a score of 0 to 10,
where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.” I use the same coding of the answers
as presented in the question. A higher value measures higher trust as it signals a stronger agreement with the statement
that most people can be trusted. Note that the mean trust expressed in the immigrant mother, immigrant father, and native
samples are very similar, see Table A1.
3.2. Control variables
The ESS includes a rich set of individual controls. Age, gender, marital status, education, employment status, income, and
religious afﬁliation are observed. Marital status is captured by two  dummies for married and never married, with widowed
and divorced being the excluded category. Education is captured by one dummy  for tertiary (university) degree and above,
and one dummy  for upper secondary as the highest attained degree. Lower education is the excluded category. One dummy
captures individuals who are out of the labor force (students, not employed and not looking for work, and retired), and
another dummy  for unemployed who look for work. The employed is the omitted category. Income is measured by income
decile, based on the country speciﬁc income distribution. I create one dummy for the bottom three deciles, Low Income, and
one dummy  for the middle four deciles, Middle Income. There are three dummies for the following religious denominations:
Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. All other denominations are in the excluded category.
In addition to the mother’s and father’s country of birth a few parental characteristics are used. There is information on
the parent’s highest level of education, which are captured by dummies for tertiary and upper secondary degrees as for the
12 Extensive documentation of the data is found at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.
13 Section 4.2.1 studies somewhat different samples where the parents are born in different countries as described in more detail in that section.
14 In this overlapping sample parental trust is taken from the mother’s birth country in the immigrant mother sample and from the father’s birth country
in  the immigrant father sample.
M. Ljunge / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 106 (2014) 175–196 179
AR
AT
BA
BE
BG
BR
BY
CA
CH
CS
CZ
DE
DK
DZ
EG
ES
FI
FR
GB
GE
GR
HR
HU
ID
IE
IN
IQIR
IT
LT
LV
MA
MK
NL
NO
PK
PL
PT
RO
RU
SE
SK
TR
UA US
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
Tr
us
t d
iff
er
en
ce
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 n
at
ive
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Inherited trust from the mother’s birth country
Trust difference to natives Fitted values
F
t
i
i
y
3
t
t
t
f
t
c
t
t
c
4
i
i
t
a
t
e
4
o
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o  1, most people can be trusted. Trust difference is measured by deviations from the national average (across 29 nations). The sample is second generation
mmigrants with an immigrant mother. Country labels follow ISO-3166. Data are from the European Social Survey and the World Values Survey.
ndividual himself. There is also information on the mother’s and father’s employment status when the respondent was 14
ears old, and a dummy  captures if the mother and father was employed.
.3. Trust in the parent’s country of birth
Average trust in the parent’s country of birth is computed across the waves in the integrated European Values Survey and
he World Values Survey (EVS/WVS).15 This allows the analysis of second generation immigrants to be expanded beyond
hose with ancestry in the countries covered by the ESS. In the EVS/WVS trust is observed for 87 nations, which is three times
he number of countries in the ESS. Moreover, the countries in the EVS/WVS are much more diverse and include countries
rom Africa, the Americas, and Asia.16 The trust questions are worded similarly in the ESS and the EVS/WVS.
The question regarding trust in the EVS/WVS is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
hat you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The possible answers are “Most people can be trusted,” which is
oded as 1, and “Can′t be too careful,” which is coded as 0. The average of this variable is computed for each country across
he waves in which the question is asked. The average is increasing in trust, that is, the higher the fraction who answers
hat most people can be trusted. The fraction with high trust and the number of second generation immigrants by mother’s
ountry of birth are presented in Table A3.
. Results
Strong evidence of intergenerational transmission of trust is found. The individual trust of second generation immigrants
s inﬂuenced by the level of trust in the parent’s country of birth. The effect is particularly pronounced for individuals with an
mmigrant mother. The transmission is stronger for individuals who are born and reside in high trusting Northern Europe.
The ﬁndings are illustrated in Fig. 1. The horizontal axis measures the share in the mother’s birth country who expresses
hat most people can be trusted. The vertical axis measures the trust of second generation immigrants with a particular
ncestry relative to natives, averaged across the 29 countries of birth studied.17 The positive relationship indicates that
hose with higher trusting ancestry tend to express higher trust than those with lower trust ancestry. This is the variation
xplored in the analysis below while accounting of individual, parental, and ancestral country characteristics.
.1. Ancestral country trust and its inﬂuence on the children of immigrantsI begin by analyzing the sample with an immigrant mother. Apart from including the mean trust in the mother’s country
f birth only the most exogenous individual characteristics age and its square, and gender are included as controls in the
rst speciﬁcation in Table 1. All regressions also include a full set of country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effects. The point
15 The country average is based on the ﬁve EVS/WVS waves collected between 1981 and 2008.
16 Extensive documentation of the data is available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
17 Fig. 1 includes ancestral countries with at least 20 second generation immigrants in the sample. The relationship is very similar in the full sample.
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Table 1
Effects of trust in parent’s birth country on children’s trust.
Dependent variable: Trust Immigrant mother
(1)
Immigrant mother
(2)
Immigrant father
(3)
Immigrant father
(4)
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.073 0.984
(0.474)** (0.414)**
Trust, father’s birth country 0.355 0.274
(0.556) (0.486)
Age 0.003  −0.022 −0.004 −0.024
(0.009) (0.011)* (0.007) (0.012)**
Age squared/100 −0.003 0.026 0.004 0.026
(0.011) (0.011)** (0.007) (0.012)**
Female −0.055 −0.009 −0.008 −0.026
(0.044) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052)
Married 0.180 0.035
(0.074)** (0.072)
Never  married 0.221 0.027
(0.125)* (0.119)
Upper  secondary 0.357 0.246
(0.086)*** (0.092)***
College or university 0.903 0.959
(0.091)*** (0.100)***
Out of the labor force −0.157 −0.055
(0.079)** (0.061)
Unemployed −0.419 −0.350
(0.141)*** (0.182)*
Low income −0.194 −0.148
(0.078)** (0.081)*
Middle income 0.013 −0.006
(0.049) (0.056)
Catholic −0.081 −0.039
(0.079) (0.098)
Protestant 0.277 0.142
(0.084)*** (0.102)
Orthodox 0.123 0.130
(0.169) (0.105)
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.107 0.127 0.098 0.117
Observations 7510 7235 7843 7535
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants; columns (1) and (2) study those with an immigrant mother and columns (3) and (4) those with an immigrant father. All regressions include a
full  set of country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effects. Data is from the second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis,
which allow for clustering on the parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
estimate on trust in the mother’s country of birth is positive and strongly signiﬁcant. It means that second generation immi-
grants with a mother from high trusting countries tend to have higher trust levels than other individuals who  live in the
same country. The compared children of immigrants are born and reside in the same country but those with mother’s from
higher trusting countries systematically express higher trust. It is possible that the individuals with different ancestry differ
in other characteristics, which in turn affect trust. This is taken into account by including controls for a range of individual
characteristics that the literature has shown to be important.18 The controls include marital status, education, employment
status, income, and religion. The point estimate on trust in the mother’s birth country remains strongly signiﬁcant. Of the
individual controls education is strongly related to higher trust as are Protestants. The inﬂuence of trust in the mother’s
country of birth is quantitatively signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation increase in the trust of the mother’s country corre-
sponds to the individual reporting higher trust by 0.2 points, which correspond to .08 of a standard deviation of individual
trust.19 The magnitude corresponds to the difference in trust among those in the bottom three deciles of the income distri-
bution compared to the top three deciles. The effect also corresponds to half the effect of having an upper secondary degree
(compared to less education). The magnitudes are comparable to those for the transmission of redistributive preferences
among ﬁrst generation immigrants in Luttmer and Singhal (2011).
The literature has considered some additional individual controls for explaining trust. Religiosity has been examined by
Berggren and Bjørnskov (2011) in a cross-country analysis. Uslaner (2002) argues that optimism is an important determinant
18 See for example Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
19 Individual trust is measured on a 10 point scale, while the trust in the parent’s country of birth is measured on the unit interval.
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f trust, as well as attitudes toward inequality. My  results are robust to including these controls but the estimates are not
eported in the baseline speciﬁcation since their exogeneity is not clear.20 Furthermore, some of the intergenerational
ransmission of trust could operate through these channels. Hence, including them as controls would shut down potentially
mportant ways in which trust is transmitted across generations.
The analysis is repeated for the sample with an immigrant father in speciﬁcations 3 and 4 of Table 1.21 The point estimate
n trust in the father’s birth country is positive as in the immigrant mother sample, but the estimate is not signiﬁcant. This
oes not mean that fathers have no inﬂuence on the child’s trust, in particular since the method has a built in attenuation
ias, but that the transmission is not strong enough.22 The differences in transmission on the mother’s and father’s side are
xamined in further detail in Section 4.2.1.
All the available data is used in the results presented. There may  be a concern that including ancestral countries with few
hildren of immigrants introduce noise into the estimation. I do not ﬁnd this to be the case as results are similar if I require
here to be at least 15 immigrants from an ancestral country, as practiced by Algan and Cahuc (2010).23
It is possible that immigrants are overcompensating their attitudes to counteract stereotypes of the ancestral country.
or example, individuals with ancestry from low trust countries could be very trusting as a response to the expectation that
eople with that ancestry have low trust. Such behavior would however attenuate the estimated coefﬁcient on trust in the
ncestral country, and it could not explain the signiﬁcant relationships estimated.
Selection of immigrants is not necessarily a problem for the analysis. First, the second generation immigrants have not
hosen to emigrate, and being born and raised in the country of residence they are integrated in society, which attenuates
uch concerns. The children of immigrants also look similar to the general population on observables and the estimates
n the demographic variables are similar.24 Even so, the estimates would not be affected by selection if it is uniform. For
xample, if only high trust individuals choose to emigrate it would not necessarily affect the estimate since only variation
n differences, not levels, across ancestries is used to identify the estimates. Furthermore, if there is positive sorting so that
igh trust individuals move to high trust countries, and that the hypothesis of cultural transmission of trust is true, this
ould compress the variation in the left hand side variable and bias the estimate toward zero. Yet, one can never be certain
hat selection on unobservables do not inﬂuence the results.
.1.1. Ancestral country characteristics
Table 1 addressed the concern that individual characteristics are correlated with trust in the parental birth country.
nother concern may  be that other characteristics of the parent’s birth country are correlated with trust, which could
onfound the estimate. As countries with higher income tend to be more trusting I want to separate these effects. Table 2
ncludes the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product (gdp) per capita in the parent’s birth country. The following
egressions also include the extensive set of individual controls included in Table 1 (columns 2 and 4) as well as country-
y-year ﬁxed effects. The results for the sample with an immigrant mother are in speciﬁcation 1 in Table 2. The estimate on
rust in the mother’s birth country remains strongly signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude. The results cannot be explained
y the level of income in the country of ancestry. Another concern may  be that political institutions correlate with trust, as
ore democratic countries tend to display higher trust. Speciﬁcation 2 adds the polity2 variable from the Polity IV project
n the mother’s birth country.25 The inﬂuence of trust remains, and neither income nor political institutions are signiﬁcant.
As mothers who do not work may  spend more time with their children and potentially have a larger role in their trust
ormation it may  be relevant to account for female labor force participation. One broad measure of such effects is the average
emale labor force participation (LFP) of women in the mother’s birth country, which is added to the model in speciﬁcation 3
f Table 2. The estimate on ancestral trust drops slightly but remains strongly signiﬁcant. The estimate on ancestral country
FP is positive, contrasting with the conjecture of more time with the child being important, and signiﬁcant. Education is
 strong correlate with trust and mother’s education has been found important for children. The fraction of women with a
igher education in the ancestral country is accounted for in the fourth column of Table 2. The estimate on female education
n the ancestral country is insigniﬁcant and the other estimates are unaffected by this additional control. The inﬂuence of
rust is hence robust to accounting for these additional ancestral inﬂuences. The inﬂuence of the mother’s labor supply and
ducation will be accounted for directly, using measures of the second generation immigrant’s mother, in the next section.
An exercise closely related to Table 2 provides a quantiﬁcation of the importance of ancestral trust relative to other ances-
ral inﬂuences in determining the trust of second generation immigrants. The exercise involves four steps. First, individual
rust (in the immigrant mother sample) is regressed on country of ancestry ﬁxed effects (rather than ancestral country trust),
s well as the individual controls and country-by-year ﬁxed effects. Second, the estimated country of ancestry ﬁxed effects,
hich capture average trust differences for all immigrant groups, are regressed on ancestral country trust. Ancestral trust
an explain 23.6% of the average trust differences. Third, the estimated coefﬁcients are regressed on ancestral trust as well
20 I use the degree of religiosity, happiness to capture optimism, and preferences toward redistribution to capture attitudes toward inequality.
21 There is some overlap in the sample since some individuals have parents who both are immigrants.
22 See Ljunge (2014b) for evidence on how the father’s ancestry builds trust.
23 The results are also robust to cut-offs at 5, 10, 20, or 25 observations per ancestral country.
24 For a comparison on estimates on the demographic variables see Table A4.
25 A higher value of the variable captures more democratic institutions.
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Table 2
Effects of trust accounting for ancestral country characteristics.
Sample: Immigrant
mother
(1)
Immigrant
mother
(2)
Immigrant
mother
(3)
Immigrant
mother
(4)
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.017 1.030 0.847 0.862
(0.400)** (0.403)** (0.351)** (0.348)**
log(gdp), mother’s birth country 0.108 0.099 0.084 0.084
(0.043)** (0.056)* (0.057) (0.057)
Polity2, mother’s birth country 0.001 −0.003 −0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Women’s LFP, mother’s birth country 0.903 0.988
(0.237)*** (0.264)***
Women’s education, mother’s birth
country
−0.192
(0.233)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.135 0.132 0.133 0.133
Observations 6829 6738 6738 6738
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants with an immigrant mother. Polity2 is increasing the more democratic political institutions are, LFP measures labor force participations of
women, and education is measured by the fraction with a tertiary degree. All regressions include a full set of country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effects.
Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and religious denomination. Data is from the second to
ﬁfth  waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
as ancestral country log(gdp), polity2, female LFP, and female education. This model can account for 36% of the average
trust differences. Fourth, we can compute that ancestral trust can account for 65% of the explained trust variation indicating
that ancestral trust is a quantitatively important factor for explaining trust differences across ancestries. The estimates are
presented in Table A5.
4.1.2. Parental characteristics
There may  be concerns that the parents who emigrate from high trusting countries are particular compared to others. In
particular, these parents may  have higher education levels, which may  translate into higher trust of the child.26 I control for
the parents’ level of education (highest attained), as well as their employment when the individual was 14 years of age. The
results are robust to adding these controls as seen in Table 3. The estimates of trust in the mother’s birth country, now slightly
smaller in magnitude, remain strongly signiﬁcant. Trust in the father’s country of birth remains positive but insigniﬁcant.
Another result from Table 3 is that parental education has a positive impact on the child’s trust conditional on all the other
covariates. The result is the strongest and most robust with respect to tertiary education. The estimates are quite similar for
mother’s and father’s education. Several speciﬁcations also indicate a positive effect of upper secondary education. Having
a working father, at age 14, has a strong positive effect on the child’s trust, while no such effect is estimated for mothers
indicating that the mother’s labor supply is not an important factor in trust transmission.
4.1.3. Ancestral vs. birth country inﬂuence
To assess the quantitative importance of ancestral compared to birth country trust in forming individual trust a model
without country of birth ﬁxed effects is estimated. Trust of second generation immigrants with an immigrant mother are
regressed on ancestral and birth country trust, individual controls, and survey round ﬁxed effects. Birth and ancestral country
trust are measured as averages across the waves of the integrated EVS/WVS.27
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 4 includes only the most exogenous individual controls and the second speciﬁcation adds
the baseline set of individual controls. Both ancestral and birth country trust are positive and highly signiﬁcant. The magni-
tude of the ancestral trust estimate is about half that of birth country trust. To account for other birth country characteristics
the log of GDP and polity2 in the birth country are added to the model in speciﬁcations three and four of Table 4. Economic
development is signiﬁcant in the third speciﬁcation, but when the political institutions are added they are strongly signiﬁcant
while economic development is no longer signiﬁcant.
26 However, I control for the individual’s education level, which may capture the main effect of transmission of trust through education. Moreover, parental
selection would not be a concern as long as it is common across ancestral backgrounds since only within country of residence variation is used.
27 Measuring birth country trust and individual trust in the same context introduces a potential endogeneity issue, as mentioned above. Appropriate
caution in interpreting the coefﬁcients is hence called for.
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Table  3
Effects of trust in parent’s birth country conditional on parental education.
Dependent variable: Trust
Sample: Immigrant
mother
(1)
Immigrant
mother
(2)
Immigrant
mother
(3)
Immigrant
mother
(4)
Immigrant
father
(5)
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.864 0.857 0.834 0.829
(0.397)** (0.398)** (0.388)** (0.386)**
Trust, father’s birth country 0.146
(0.437)
Upper secondary education, mother 0.196 0.188 0.092 0.086 0.274
(0.069)*** (0.070)*** (0.089) (0.090) (0.072)***
Tertiary education, mother 0.434 0.421 0.316 0.309 0.335
(0.094)*** (0.094)*** (0.124)** (0.124)** (0.115)***
Mother working
(when individual age 14)
0.057 0.053 0.029
(0.045) (0.045) (0.051)
Upper  secondary education, father 0.224 0.199 −0.017
(0.088)** (0.087)** (0.050)
Tertiary education, father 0.230 0.200 0.220
(0.114)** (0.114)* (0.114)*
Father working
(when individual age 14)
0.251 0.313
(0.082)*** (0.064)***
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.129 0.129 0.130 0.131 0.122
Observations 7235 7235 7235 7235 7535
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants; columns (1)–(4) study those with an immigrant mother and column (5) those with an immigrant father. All regressions include a full set of
country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effects. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and religious
denomination. Data is from the second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the
parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 4
Ancestral vs. birth country inﬂuences on trust.
Dependent variable: Trust
Sample: Immigrant mother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.736 1.463 1.547 1.601 1.825
(0.459)*** (0.330)*** (0.356)*** (0.413)*** (0.491)***
Trust, birth country 4.126 3.945 3.414 3.747 3.697
(0.502)*** (0.375)*** (0.387)*** (0.360)*** (0.390)***
log(gdp), birth country 0.356 −0.133 −0.186
(0.067)*** (0.160) (0.164)
Polity2,  birth country 0.278 0.299
(0.062)*** (0.067)***
log(gdp), mother’s birth country 0.022
(0.062)
Polity2, mother’s birth country −0.013
(0.008)
Individual controls Age, gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.068 0.097 0.100 0.108 0.111
Observations 7510 7235 7235 7024 6529
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants with an immigrant mother. Individual controls in columns (2)–(5) include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income,
and  religious denomination. Data is from the second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering
on  the parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Ancestral country log of GDP and polity2 are added to the model, to account for alternative trust inﬂuences, in the ﬁfth
column of Table 4. The estimate on ancestral country trust is almost exactly half the magnitude of the estimate on birth
country trust when accounting for economic development and political institutions in both the ancestral and birth country.
The estimates indicate that one third of the trust inﬂuences could be attributed to the ancestral country and two  thirds to
the birth country. It indicates a quantitatively important role for trust inﬂuences across generations in combination with
trust inﬂuences in the birth country.
4.2. Heterogeneity
Several dimensions of heterogeneity are considered. First is the issue if the transmission is different on the mother’s
and father’s side. Second, I examine if the transmission is inﬂuenced by the trust levels in the birth as well as the ancestral
country. Third, I examine if individual factors, like being more integrated or having a highly educated mother, affect the
transmission of trust. Estimates for the second and third dimensions are only presented for individuals with an immigrant
mother in order to conserve space. Estimates with the immigrant father sample show the same pattern as for mothers but
estimates are less precise.
4.2.1. Mother’s vs. father’s inﬂuence
To further explore the different estimates for mothers, which are strongly signiﬁcant, and, fathers, which are insigniﬁcant,
in Table 1 the parental trust measures are expanded to also include native parents. The beneﬁt of the approach is the ability
to study the inﬂuences of trust on the mother’s and father’s side in the same model for a sample including those with one
native parent. To focus on the potentially differential trust transmission across mothers and fathers this section only includes
individuals whose parents are born in different countries.28 Just as for immigrant parents, the parental trust for the native
parent (if any) is the average fraction trusting in the birth country computed across the waves in the EVS/WVS.
The focus is on comparing the inﬂuences of trust from the immigrant mother’s and father’s ancestral countries, trust
measures which plausibly are not endogenous to the child’s trust. The inﬂuence of trust in the immigrant parent’s country
is examined through different sample cuts and augmented country ﬁxed effects.29 Adding the trust of native parents to
the model has potentially subtle but important implications for the interpretation of estimates, which are examined and
discussed below.
The independent variables of main interest are trust in the mother’s and father’s birth country, respectively. The ﬁrst
sample includes those with an immigrant mother and a native born father, that is, a father born in the same country as the
child. In this sample the trust in the father’s birth country is collinear with the country ﬁxed effect as everyone in the sample
has a native father who is assigned the birth country’s trust level.30 The positive and strongly signiﬁcant estimate on trust
in the mother’s birth country is presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 5. The estimate indicates that there is strong trust
transmission among immigrant women who couple with a native father.31 This could be understood as Bisin and Verdier’s
(2001) cultural transmission model, where minorities may  expend a lot of effort to transmit their cultural traits, applied to
the family. Mothers who marry a native have to work hard to transmit her cultural values to the child since both the father
and society has the same cultural background, and the estimates indicate these mothers work hard on cultural transmission.
The second column of Table 5 studies those with an immigrant father and native born mother. The native born mothers’
trust is collinear with the country ﬁxed effects, similarly to the previous speciﬁcation. The estimate on the father’s trust is
close to zero and insigniﬁcant. The ﬁndings mirror the pattern in Table 1.32
The next two speciﬁcations study a sample where the mother is an immigrant and the father is native or of different
immigrant ancestry compared to the mother. Speciﬁcation 3 in Table 5 includes country ﬁxed effects, which no longer are
collinear with trust in the father’s birth country. Hence, the regression produces an estimate on trust in both the mother’s
and father’s birth country. The estimate on the mother’s side is strongly signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude to the ﬁrst
column. The estimate on the father’s side is of similar magnitude but not signiﬁcant.
Consider what variation is used to identify the estimate on the father’s side in column 3 of Table 5. It may  be tempting
to think that it is driven solely by the expanded sample of immigrant fathers with different ancestry than the mothers. A
somewhat more subtle point in this speciﬁcation is that the country ﬁxed effects are no longer collinear with trust among
the native fathers. Not everyone in the sample has a native father and the country ﬁxed effect captures average trust among
all children of immigrants (who are included in the sample) in that country. Hence, both trust in the native countries and
trust in immigrant fathers’ ancestral countries are used to identify the estimate on father’s trust. Using native country trust
28 The mother’s birth country trust is collinear with the father’s if both are born in the same country.
29 The analysis in this section is based on a sample where there are at least 20 observations with ancestry from the mother’s and father’s birth country.
The  results are similar in samples with smaller ancestral groups included albeit slightly less precisely estimated.
30 In this table country and year ﬁxed effects are used to conserve on the number of ﬁxed effects when augmented country ﬁxed effects are used in later
speciﬁcations. Results with country and year ﬁxed effects are very similar to when country-by-year effects are used.
31 Restricting the sample to second generation immigrants where both parents are immigrants yield qualitatively similar results as in Table 5 but much
less  precisely estimated. This also indicates that mothers marrying a native are important to include in the sample to yield the strong transmission of trust.
32 The somewhat higher point estimate on the father’s side in Table 1 compared to Table 5 is explained by fathers with the same ancestry as mothers
being  included in the sample in Table 1 but not in Table 5.
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Table 5
Mother’s vs. father’s inﬂuences. Samples with different parental ancestries.
Dependent variable: Trust
Sample: Mother
immigrant
Father native
(1)
Father
immigrant
Mother native
(2)
Mother
immigrant
Father native
or different
immigrant
than mother
(3)
Mother
immigrant
Father native
or different
immigrant
than mother
(4)
Father
immigrant
Mother native
or different
immigrant
than father
(5)
Father
immigrant
Mother native
or different
immigrant
than father
(6)
Mother native
or different
immigrant
Father native
or different
immigrant
(7)
Mother native
or different
immigrant
Father native
or different
immigrant
(8)
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.130 1.157 1.116 1.797 1.492 0.782 1.176
(0.478)** (0.461)** (0.453)** (0.928)* (1.323) (0.370)** (0.459)**
Trust, father’s birth country −0.070 0.987 −0.376 −0.089 −0.079 0.576 −0.072
(0.426) (0.853) (1.204) (0.405) (0.403) (0.345)* (0.403)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year  ﬁxed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  by father native FE Yes Yes
Country  by mother native FE Yes Yes
Test  of
Trust, mother’s birth country=
Trust, father’s birth country(p-value to reject) 0.861 0.245 0.069 0.255 0.604 0.044
R-squared 0.156 0.136 0.134 0.138 0.120 0.122 0.136 0.138
Observations 3323 3655 3932 3930 4265 4263 7585 7583
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation immigrants with at least one immigrant parent. This table
studies  samples where the parents are born in different countries. The ﬁrst (second) speciﬁcation studies samples where the mother (father) is an immigrant while the father (mother) is native, that is, born in
the  same country as the child. The third and fourth (ﬁfth and sixth) speciﬁcations adds immigrant fathers (mothers) born in different countries than the immigrant mother (father) to the sample. Speciﬁcations 7
and  8 includes all individuals with an immigrant mother and/or father as well as one native parent (if one parent not immigrant) as long as the parents are born in different countries. The test of equality refers
to  the ﬁrst two estimates reported in each speciﬁcation. All regressions include a full set of country of residence and year ﬁxed effects. Speciﬁcations 4, 6, and 8 also include country of residence ﬁxed effects
interacted  with if the mother and/or father is native born. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and religious denomination. Data is from the second to
ﬁfth  waves of the European Social Survey. The sample includes immigrant groups with at least 20 observations. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the parents’ birth countries.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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variation may  introduce a kind of simultaneity bias in the father’s trust estimate toward ﬁnding a positive estimate since
trust of an individual and average trust in his birth country tend to be positively correlated.
To avoid using native country trust in identifying the inﬂuence of father’s trust one may  introduce a new set of country
ﬁxed effects. An indicator for if the father is a native is interacted with the country ﬁxed effects. These ﬁxed effects are
added to the model in column 4 of Table 5. These added ﬁxed effects are collinear with birth country trust among native
fathers. The point estimate on father’s trust goes from being close to one (and similar in magnitude to mothers trust) to
being negative and highly insigniﬁcant. The point estimate on fathers trust is identiﬁed solely from immigrant fathers (with
different ancestry than the mothers). The estimate on the mother’s side changes little between columns 3 and 4 in Table 5,
and remains similar to the ﬁrst column of the same table.
The mirror sample, where the father is an immigrant and the mother either native or of different immigrant ancestry
than father, is studied in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.33 The estimates on the father’s trust are, as one may  expect, close to
zero and insigniﬁcant, as in column 2 of Table 5. The estimates on the mother’s side are larger in magnitude compared to
previous columns. In column 5, where both native and foreign trust variation is used, the point estimate is the highest and
signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.054. In column 6 of Table 5, where only variation in foreign born mothers are used, the point
estimate on mother’s trust falls slightly and becomes less precisely estimated.
Although it is hard to make strong statements about estimates with larger error bands there is a pattern in columns 3–6
in Table 5. Including variation in native country trust seems to have a systematic increasing effect on the corresponding
estimates. The father’s trust estimate is high in column 3 and low in column 4. Hence, in column 3 the inﬂuence of mother’s
and father’s trust seem more similar compared to column 4. This is also captured by the test of equality where the p-value
drops. Correspondingly, a higher estimate is produced in column 5 (where native trust variation is used) compared to column
6. In this case the use of native country trust accentuates the difference between mothers and fathers, which again is captured
by the low p-value in column 5 compared to column 6.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 5 include native born individuals whose parents are born in different countries (either
both immigrants from different countries or one immigrant and one native parent). Country ﬁxed effects are used in column
7 of Table 5. Both the estimates on the mother’s and father’s side are identiﬁed from variation in both immigrant and native
parents’ birth country trust. Both the estimates on the mother’s and father’s side are positive and signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. The estimates are of similar magnitude and far from being rejected as different although the standard errors are the
smallest in the table.
To avoid using native birth country trust variation in identifying the estimates two sets of ﬁxed effects are added to the
model. Country ﬁxed effects are interacted with if the father or the mother is a native, respectively. These two additional
sets of ﬁxed effects are collinear with native country trust if the mother or father is a native. The parental trust estimates
are solely identiﬁed from variation in birth country trust from immigrant parents. The estimates reveal a strong positive
and signiﬁcant estimate on the mother’s side and an insigniﬁcant estimate close to zero on the father’s side in column 8 of
Table 5.34 Moreover, the estimates are signiﬁcantly different on the mother’s and father’s side. This indicates that mothers
have a more important role than fathers in transmitting ancestral trust to their children. The signiﬁcant differences across
parents using parental trust measures that are not endogenous to the child’s trust and accounting for individual controls
complements Dohmen et al. (2012) who report a signiﬁcant difference between individually reported parental trust measures
when no individual controls are included.
The analysis in Table 5 points to the importance of not using variation in trust from the native parent when estimating
cultural transmission models, as such variation may  introduce a simultaneity bias. Such bias may  lead to drastically different
conclusions regarding trust transmission compared to estimates avoiding such biases. In column 7 of Table 5 the trust
transmission looks similar for mother’s and father’s side, yet this appears driven by the variation in trust among native
born parents. In column 8 of Table 5, which only uses variation in trust from foreign born parents (trust that plausibly is
not endogenous to the individuals trust), there is a signiﬁcant difference between mothers and fathers and a virtual zero
estimate on the father’s side. The speciﬁcation in column 8 is clearly preferred over column 7 as the simultaneity bias is
avoided.
4.2.2. Birth and ancestral country trust levels
Previous studies of the intergenerational transmission of trust, such as Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Dohmen et al. (2012),have only studied one country (the U.S. or Germany). Luttmer and Singhal (2011) study the transmission of redistributive
preferences in a range of countries but they do not examine if there is a differential effect across countries of residence or
ancestry. The combination of many residence as well as ancestral countries allows the study of trust transmission in different
33 The speciﬁcations in columns 3 and 5 include a dummy  variable for if both parents are immigrants to account for trust differences across groups. The
dummy  is insigniﬁcant in both speciﬁcations, indicating that there are not systematic trust differences across individuals with two  immigrant parents
compared to those with one native and one immigrant parent. This dummy  is not included in columns 4 and 6 since it is collinear with the augmented
set  of country ﬁxed effects. The country ﬁxed effects interacted with the dummy  for one parent being a native is a ﬂexible way to account for unobserved
differences between parental couple types within each country.
34 The speciﬁcation in column 7 includes two dummy  variables for if the mother or father is an immigrant, respectively. These dummies are not included
in  column 8 since they are collinear with the augmented set of country ﬁxed effects.
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Table  6
High vs. low ancestral and birth country trust.
Dependent variable: Trust
Cut-off for high ancestral country trust (fraction expressing most people can be trusted) (1) 0.30 (2) 0.40 (3)
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.063
if  ancestral country trust ≥ birth country trust (0.410)**
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.389
if  ancestral country trust < birth country trust (0.572)**
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.217 1.083
if  high birth country trust and high ancestral country trust (0.515)** (0.438)**
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.658 1.359
if  high birth country trust and low ancestral country trust (0.898)* (0.672)**
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.797 1.656
if  low birth country trust and high ancestral country trust (0.728) (0.560)***
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.198 0.404
if  low birth country trust and low ancestral country trust (1.066) (0.776)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.127 0.127 0.127
Observations 7235 7235 7235
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants with an immigrant mother. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and religious
denomination. Data is from the second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the
parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
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ombinations of average trust in the residence and ancestral country. This analysis could shed light on the hypothesis in for
xample Butler et al. (2011) that adjustment to low trust environments is much faster than adaptation to high trust.
The analysis begins by distinguishing countries by if the ancestral country trust is at least as large as the birth country
rust, or if ancestral trust is less than birth country trust. This allows the estimation of an asymmetry in the trust transmission
ith different coefﬁcients for if the adjustment is to higher or lower trust levels.
The estimates on mother’s birth country trust are positive and signiﬁcant for both groups as seen in column 1 of Table 6.
he estimated coefﬁcient is larger for the group who  adjusts to higher trust levels. It indicates that low trust could be more
ersistent than high trust. Perhaps this could be explained by low trusting individuals engaging in fewer encounters where
hey may  learn about the higher trust in the residence country.
In the next two models ancestral and birth countries are divided into high and low trusting, respectively.35 The resulting
our groups are interacted with trust in the mother’s birth country to estimate the trust transmission in each group. First,
ncestral country trust is considered high if at least 30% express that most people can be trusted.36
Signiﬁcant trust transmission is found for both low and high ancestral trust individuals who  are born in high trusting
ountries as seen in column 2 of Table 6. The estimated coefﬁcient on those with lower trust ancestry is higher in magnitude
han for those with higher trust ancestry (who live in high trust countries). This ordering indicates that trust is more persistent
hen adjusting to higher levels, as discussed above. Estimates on ancestral trust for those in low trust birth countries are
nsigniﬁcant.37
The evidence points to signiﬁcant differences in the intergenerational transmission of trust. The transmission is stronger
n high trusting (Northern European) countries than low trusting (Southern European) nations. The children of immigrants
n high trusting countries have not adapted to the trust levels in those countries. In low trusting Europe there is no signiﬁcant
elationship between individual and ancestral trust, consistent with an adaptation to the local equilibrium by the children
f immigrants born in this environment.
The differences in the strength of the transmission of trust across high and low trusting Europe can be understood through
 model like Butler et al. (2011). In the model high trusting individuals choose to interact with others in society more than
ow trusting individuals, since high trusting individuals have a higher expected payoff given his subjective probabilities
n the other party being trustworthy. When a high trusting individual interacts in a low trusting context he will soon be
heated and might update his trust. Low trusting individuals rarely interact even in a high trust context. He hence has few
35 High trust birth countries are Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, Ireland, Estonia, UK, Luxemburg, Austria, Israel, Spain, Belgium,
nd  Germany based on trust across the ESS rounds.
36 This cut-off is slightly above the 29.1% average ancestral trust in the immigrant mother sample.
37 Similar results are found when the sample is split by geographical lines. Northern Europe represents high trusting countries exhibit strong transmission
hile Southern Europe has lower trust and less transmission. See Ljunge (2012c) for details.
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opportunities to update his trust to the higher level that would be beneﬁcial in the high trust environment. The increase in
trust is hence slow. The evidence presented here suggests that this process has yet to converge by the second generation.
The third speciﬁcation of Table 6 classiﬁes ancestral countries as high trust if at least 40% express that most people can
be trusted.38 The transmission of trust in high trust birth countries is signiﬁcant both for those with high and low trust
ancestries. The estimated coefﬁcient is larger for those with low trust ancestry compared to those with high trust ancestry,
as in the previous speciﬁcation.
Very different from the previous model is the large positive and highly signiﬁcant estimate on ancestral trust among
children of immigrants in low trust birth countries who  have high trust ancestry.39 This indicates a non-linearity in the
transmission of trust where there is strong persistence at very high levels, which I believe has not been found in the literature.
This complements the previously discussed ﬁnding that trust may  be highly persistent at low levels.
The ﬁnding of high trust persistence in low trust environments is not easy to reconcile with Butler et al.’s (2011) model
and suggests there are other processes at work. The result seems to ﬁt more with Bisin and Verdier’s (2001) model of cultural
transmission persistent over the life cycle. The ﬁnding also provides a counter point to ﬁndings that dramatic changes in
the trust environment, such as Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), could erode trust. Their study is set in Africa where trust on
average is low, much lower than in Europe, also in areas not affected by slave trade. The ﬁnding here suggests that high trust
may  persist also in, by European standards, low trust environments if individuals have a sufﬁciently high trust background.
Note that the result should not be interpreted as a positive effect from welfare state institutions on trust for all
immigrants.40 The effects of such institutions are captured by the country ﬁxed effect. Since within country variation is
used the estimate tells us that immigrants from low trust countries remain systematically below the average trust level (and
similarly for immigrants from high trust countries), and the distance is proportional to the trust in the ancestral country.
4.2.3. Individual characteristics
In this section the trust level in the mother’s country of birth is interacted with several individual characteristics that we
may suspect have differential implications for trust transmission. The purpose is to examine if transmission of trust differs
across these dimension. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation considers a measure of how integrated the second generation immigrants
are. An indicator for a second language spoken at home is fully interacted with trust in the mother’s country. 38% of the
sample speaks a second language at home, which yields a fairly even split of the sample between the interaction terms. The
point estimate on the transmission is higher for those who do not speak a second language at home as seen in model A in
Table 7.41 The test of equality of the coefﬁcients does not reject at conventional levels. This indicates that the transmission
of trust is not different for those who are less assimilated, measured by second language.
The following two speciﬁcations split the sample by strength of the direct vertical transmission. Model B splits the
interaction by age, with those above 40 years of age being less exposed to parental inﬂuences and more exposed to horizontal
inﬂuences in the current society. The point estimate in model B in Table 7 for those less than 40 years old, and more closely
connected to parental inﬂuences, is higher than for the older group. The results are consistent with the hypothesis but the
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. The same ﬁnding holds when Internet use is considered. Internet provides another
channel of horizontal inﬂuence which may  weaken the direct inﬂuence by parents. The point estimates support this story
as the intergenerational inﬂuence is lower for those who  use the Internet at least once a week, as seen in model C in Table 7.
The coefﬁcients are, however, not signiﬁcantly different. The results indicate that we cannot reject that intergenerationally
transmitted trust persists over the life cycle or that it is diluted by Internet use. The results are consistent with Bisin and
Verdier’s (2001) model of cultural transmission over the life cycle.
The last three speciﬁcations examine if maternal characteristics inﬂuence the transmission of trust. The effect of having
a working mother at age 14 is examined in model D in Table 7. The point estimate for having a working mother is similar
to the transmission for those who do not.42 Model E in Table 7 examines if the transmission of trust differs by the mother’s
education. The transmission coefﬁcient is much higher for those who have a mother with upper secondary or tertiary
education compared to those with a less educated mother. The difference is close to being signiﬁcant with a p-value of
13.6%. In model F separate coefﬁcients are estimated for highly educated mothers who  worked and those who did not work,
as well as mothers with lower education. The estimated transmission is strong for both the highly educated mothers who
worked and those who did not. The magnitudes are similar. This is evidence against the hypothesis that weaker transmission
is found with mothers who spend time away from the home, either through work or education. Rather, for transmission
of trust high education of the mothers seems important while their labor supply seems to have no inﬂuence. The results
indicate that higher education facilitates norm transmission. Highly educated mothers might choose to spend more time
socializing their children to their norms or they might be more efﬁcient in doing so (or both).
38 This moves the following ancestral countries from the high to low ancestral trust category: Austria, Belgium, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, South Korea,
Spain, and UK.
39 The test of equality of coefﬁcients rejects at the 6% level.
40 The relationship between welfare state institutions have been analyzed by Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) and Kumlin and Rothstein (2005), among others.
41 An interaction of ancestral trust with being a citizen of the country of birth yields similar point estimates for the two groups. 94% of the children of
immigrants are citizens of their birth country. See Ljunge (2012c) for details.
42 Similarly, there are no signiﬁcant differences between those whose father worked at age 14 and those whose father did not work.
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Table  7
Heterogeneity based on individual characteristics.
Model Interaction Dependent variable: Trust Coefﬁcient
(s.e.)
Test of equality
(p-value)
Observations
A Second language spoken at home Trust, mother’s birth country 1.348 0.116 7235
*No second language at home (0.345)***
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.514
*Second language at home (0.604)
B Age Trust, mother’s birth country 1.096 0.739 7235
*Less than 40 years old (0.478)**
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.889
*40 years or older (0.556)
C Internet use Trust, mother’s birth country 0.797 0.485 7235
*Use Internet frequently (0.465)*
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.154
*Do not use internet frequently (0.484)**
D Mother working at age 14 Trust, mother’s birth country 0.935 0.892 7235
*Mother working (0.429)**
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.008
*Mother not working or not present (0.561)*
E Mother’s education Trust, mother’s birth country 1.456 0.136 7235
*Mother with higher education (0.431)***
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.674
*Mother with lower education (0.469)
F Mother’s education and work Trust, mother’s birth country 1.519 0.260 7235
*Working mother with higher education (0.463)***
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.310
*Not working mother with higher education (0.443)***
Trust, mother’s birth country 0.665
*Mother with lower education (0.469)
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants with an immigrant mother. Estimated coefﬁcients on trust in the mother’s country of birth interacted with an indicator a characteristic of the
second  generation immigrant or the mother is reported. The p-value refers to a F-test of equality of the reported coefﬁcients, by model. All regressions
include a full set of country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effects. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment,
income, and religious denomination. Data is from the second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for
clustering on the parent’s birth country.
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.3. Language structure as determinant of ancestral country trust
So far the trust in the parent’s country of birth has been taken as exogenous. This section studies one factor that may
hape the ancestral trust level, and this factor is language. The idea is to examine if linguistic features have an inﬂuence on
rust levels, and to estimate how the ancestral trust shifted by these “deep” features relates to the trust of second generation
mmigrants. I combine the approach of relating language structure to trust with the epidemiological approach and apply it
o the cultural transmission of trust, which is new to the literature.
The analysis relates to the literature on the deep roots of development reviewed by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013). As trust
as been shown to promote economic development, the deep roots of trust are relevant for understanding development.
he study of language structure complements other historical determinants of trust such as Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
hey studied how negative shocks to trust, slave trade, affects current trust in Africa. Guiso et al. (2008) study how historical
actors affect trust across Italian regions. Different language structures have arguably positive or negative inﬂuences on trust,
nd the sample spans across the world.
Language structure is used as a determinant of trust. Languages have features that put more or less emphasis on how to
elate to other people. The structure of languages are stable and slow moving, arguably more so than cultural beliefs like
rust.
One feature that differs across languages is the use of ﬁrst and second pronouns in conversations. In Italian, for example,
t is permissible to drop the pronoun while in English it is mandatory to use the pronoun. Languages that forbid dropping
he ﬁrst-person pronoun are typical of cultural traditions that gave more emphasis to the individual relative to his social
ontext and thus were more respectful of the individual and his rights as argued by Kashima and Kashima (1998, 2005).
icht et al. (2007) used this grammatical rule to examine how individualism affects the rule of law. Tabellini (2008) uses
he rule to examine how trust affects institutions across countries. I follow Tabellini (2008) and deﬁne the variable “No
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Table 8
Ancestral trust on language structure.
Dependent variable: Trust in the mother’s or father’s country of birth
Sample: Immigrant
mother
(1)
Immigrant
mother
(2)
Immigrant
mother
(3)
Immigrant
father
(4)
Immigrant
father
(5)
Immigrant
father
(6)
Language structure,
mother’s birth country
0.073 0.074 0.072
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)***
Language structure,
father’s birth country
0.068 0.068 0.066
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
Language structure:
1st language spoken at home Yes Yes Yes Yes
2nd  language spoken at home Yes Yes
No  second language at home Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5957 5470 5470 6083 5544 5544
Notes: The dependent variable is average trust in the parent’s birth country. All speciﬁcations study second generation immigrants; columns (1)–(3) study
those  with an immigrant mother and columns (4)–(6) those with an immigrant father. All regressions include a full set of country of residence-by-year
ﬁxed  effects. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and religious denomination. Data is from the
second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
pronoun drop” as 1 if the language forbids the drop of pronouns and 0 otherwise, and I expect it to be positively related to
trust.
The second grammatical rule considered, in keeping with Tabellini (2008), is the distinction between singular and plu-
ral personal pronouns. French, for example, differentiates between the singular and plural You, the Tu and Vous (T-V for
short), depending on the social distance between the subjects. Many languages had the T-V distinction historically but
later dropped it. Languages who kept the T-V distinction are indicative of cultures that put stronger emphasis on hierarchy
and social distance, which may  have a negative inﬂuence on generalized trust. The variable “2nd person differentiation”
is deﬁned as 1 if the number of second person pronouns that might be used in spoken language varies according to
the social proximity between speakers and 0 otherwise.43 The variable is expected to have a negative relationship with
trust.
Based on these two variables capturing grammatical rules I deﬁne “Language” as No pronoun drop minus 2nd person
differentiation. Language is expected to be positively related to trust. The variable is deﬁned by country. For some countries
with different language groups the variable is a weighted average of the respective language groups, where possible.44
The exact deﬁnitions follow Tabellini (2008), with one adjustment.45,46 The relationship between language structure and
ancestral country trust is presented in Table 8. The estimated coefﬁcient is positive and strongly signiﬁcant.47 The positive
sign is as expected; trust is higher in countries where the language puts more emphasis on the individual’s rights, and less
emphasis on hierarchy.
The language structure, as captured by the variable Language, in the parent’s country of birth is used as an instrument
of trust in the parent’s country of birth.48 The baseline result for second generation immigrants with an immigrant mother
is presented in speciﬁcation 1 in Table 9. The point estimate on trust in the mother’s birth country is about double the
magnitude compared to Table 1 and remains strongly signiﬁcant in spite of the larger standard error. As the epidemiological
approach has an attenuation bias built in using Language as an exogenous shifter may  address the mismeasurement, which
would lead to a higher estimate of the transmission of trust.
The second stage estimates in Table 9 may  be preferred to the baseline results if they address the measurement problem.
This interpretation rests on the assumption that the ancestral country language structure has no direct effect on individual
trust of the second generation immigrant. Since the child is born and reside in a different country where the vast majority
43 The variable distinguishes between languages that allow for second person differentiation compared to those that do not. The variable does not address
if  the differentiation is common in practice, where allowed, which may  affect the accuracy of the variable. However, such mismeasurement would not
invalidate the use of the variable, but rather only attenuate the relationship between language structure and trust.
44 The weighting applies to Canada, Singapore, South Africa, and Switzerland.
45 The data is generously made available at http://didattica.unibocconi.it/mypage/index.php?IdUte=48805&idr=5112.
46 I adjust the coding of Danish to allow for second person differentiation.
47 The F-statistic for the exclusion of the Language variable is 19.
48 Similar results are obtained if the Language variable is split in its two  components, but the ﬁrst stage is not quite as strong so the Language speciﬁcation
is  preferred.
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Table  9
Language structure as exogenous shifter of ancestral trust.
Dependent variable: Trust
Sample: Immigrant
mother
(1)
Immigrant
mother
(2)
Immigrant
mother
(3)
Immigrant
father
(4)
Immigrant
father
(5)
Immigrant
father
(6)
Trust, mother’s birth country 3.051 2.982 2.687
(1.119)*** (1.129)*** (1.125)**
Trust, father’s birth country 1.508 1.052 0.458
(0.978) (0.981) (0.906)
Language structure, 1st −0.023 0.003 0.073 0.127
language spoken at home (0.087) (0.09) (0.085) (0.074)*
Language structure, 2nd 0.135 0.295
language spoken at home (0.121) (0.096)***
No second language 0.034 −0.038
spoken at home (0.100) (0.103)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5957 5470 5470 6083 5544 5544
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ All speciﬁcations study second generation
immigrants; columns (1)–(3) study those with an immigrant mother and columns (4)–(6) those with an immigrant father. Estimates on trust in the parent’s
birth  country are second stage estimates of a two stage least squares model where language structure in the parental birth country is used as an instrument
for  trust in the parental birth country. First stage estimates are presented in Table 8. All regressions include a full set of country of residence-by-year
ﬁxed effects. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and religious denomination. Data is from the
second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the parent’s birth country
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* p < 0.1.
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peaks the language of their country of residence, there is no obvious link between the child’s trust and the language structure
f the ancestral country. Remaining concerns can, at least partially, be addressed.
It is observed if the individual speaks a second language at home and what language that is, which indicates a link to
nother language. The ﬁrst language spoken is also observed. The second speciﬁcation of Table 9 includes a control for the
anguage structure of the ﬁrst language spoken, and the estimate on ancestral trust is unchanged. The third speciﬁcation
lso adds the language structure of the second language spoken as well as an indicator of a second language being spoken
t home. The transmission of trust is robust also to this speciﬁcation. The results rule out a direct effect of the languages the
ndividual speak on his trust, while the inﬂuence of ancestral trust remains.
Since Licht et al. (2007) related no pronoun drop to individualism there is a potential concern that the language structure
ay affect the individualism of the second generation immigrant. The data includes a question that captures individu-
lism by asking how important it is to be free and make your own  decision.49 Controlling for this variable has no effect
n the estimates. I conclude that there does not seem to be an effect on trust of language structure through individual-
sm.
The estimates on the sample with an immigrant father are presented in speciﬁcations 4–6 of Table 9. The point estimates
re double the magnitude of the baseline in Table 1, mirroring the results for the immigrant mother’s sample. The positive
oint estimates are consistent with transmission of trust in the immigrant father sample. The standard errors are also
arger and the estimates remain insigniﬁcant at conventional levels, which leave us with weaker evidence on the father’s
ide.
As in all empirical analysis, the interpretation of the results depends on the assumptions imposed. The interpretation of
he results in Table 9 as unbiased estimates that address the built in attenuation bias is conditional on the assumption that
ncestral language structure has no direct effect on individual trust. There is of course no way to be certain the assumption is
rue but the robustness of the results when including the controls for the languages spoken by the individual provide some
lausibility to the assumption.
. ConclusionChildren of immigrants are exogenously exposed to similar institutional environments in their countries of birth, yet
hey are inﬂuenced by different ancestral backgrounds based on where their parents were born. This is used to estimate
he intergenerational transmission of trust through the inﬂuence of ancestral trust on individual trust. The broad set of
49 The question asks if the respondent is like or not like the person in the statement “It is important to her/him to make her/his own decisions about what
he/he  does. She/he likes to be free and not depend on others.”
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countries the individuals live in and the diverse ancestral backgrounds allow a more comprehensive analysis of the cultural
transmission of trust than present in the literature.
Trust is affected by current individual and institutional inﬂuences, as indicated by the signiﬁcant individual controls
and country ﬁxed effects. However, part of trust is inﬂuenced by the cultural ancestry as captured by the effect of trust
in the parent’s country of birth. The inﬂuence from the parent’s country is quantitatively signiﬁcant and it is of similar
magnitude to individual inﬂuences such as increasing income from the bottom to the top three deciles of the income
distribution.
The results provide insights about how immigrants are integrated into society. It matters where their ancestral roots are
and where they reside. Trust may  be more persistent among immigrants from higher trusting nations. In the high trust-
ing Northern European context trust is persistent no matter the ancestry, while many individuals may  adapt to the lower
trust levels in Southern Europe by the second generation.50 Moreover, very high trust ancestry persists also in low trust
environments. It provides a mechanism for the persistence of very high trust societies; they are robust to perturbations
in the environment because of high trust transmission in the family. It is a contribution in addition to the persistence
of low trust found in this paper and other studies where a low trust environment may  be sufﬁcient to reinforce low
trust.
Trust transmission is signiﬁcant on the mother’s side, and signiﬁcantly stronger than transmission on the father’s
side, where transmission is insigniﬁcant. Is there no role for fathers? Studies using individually reported trust such as
Dohmen et al. (2012) ﬁnd positive correlations between trust of the father and child.51 This paper uses a different method
with known biases toward zero; hence the insigniﬁcant estimates might be due to these biases and need not imply that
the true effect is zero. Moreover, the father’s transmission of trust may  work through other channels. Fathers born in
countries with more democratic political institutions are found to foster trust among second generation immigrants in
Ljunge (2014b). Different ancestral facets are hence important to transmit trust to the child from the mother’s and father’s
side.52 On the mother’s side ancestral trust is important while on the father’s side it is cultural attitudes formed by political
institutions.
Although the main reason for studying children of immigrants is that it allows separating the cultural inﬂuence from
institutions, there are also policy implications from this focus. Learning about the transmission of trust matters because
trust has been associated with desirable outcomes. Algan and Cahuc (2010), Tabellini (2008, 2010), and others, ﬁnd that trust
promote economic development and the functioning of institutions at the national and regional level, hence the composition
of immigrants may  have long run effects on growth. It may  also be a consideration when immigration policies are shaped. Net
present value computations of immigration such as Storesletten (2000) could be augmented to account for the transmission of
trust. Such adjustments would, as the heterogeneity results suggest, depend on the speciﬁc context in which the immigrants
enter.
From the perspective that more trust is better, as most of the literature argues, there are two main suboptimal
aspects with the correlations of trust between parents and children. First, low trust individuals do not fully adapt
the trust in high trust environments. Second, high trust individuals adapt too much to the low trust in less trusting
environments.
The policy implication in high trust environments is to promote trust in particular among those from low trust environ-
ments to speed up the assimilation to high trust. In low trust environments the policy implication is also to promote trust, but
it is harder to point to a particular target group as the general population could also beneﬁt from trust building interventions.
The literature has suggested several ways to increase trust, which focus on more horizontal interactions among individuals.
Studies suggest more community involvement (Algesheimer et al., 2012), horizontal teaching practices (Algan et al., 2013),
more economic freedom (Knack and Zak, 2003; Aghion et al., 2010; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006), and more political freedom
(Ljunge, 2014b). In particular increased community involvement and more horizontal teaching practices may  be relevant
for policy actions targeted at groups with a low trust background.
Appendix A.
Table A1.
Table A2.
Table A3.
Table A4.
Table A5.
50 Trust levels of children of immigrants are on average similar to trust levels of natives, see Table A1.
51 Ljunge (2012b) ﬁnds that the intergenerational transmission of civicness, attitudes related to trustworthiness, is similar on the mother’s and father’s
side.
52 There are indications in Ljunge (2014c) that the inﬂuence of family ties in promoting civic attitudes differ between the mother and father.
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Table  A1
Summary statistics.
Sample variable Immigrant mother Immigrant father Native population
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Trust 4.91 2.49 4.86 2.48 4.92 2.51
Trust,  parent’s birth country 0.291 0.111 0.284 0.105
Age  43.2 17.9 42.9 17.8 47.6 18.6
Woman  0.537 0.499 0.537 0.499 0.536 0.499
Married  0.488 0.500 0.490 0.500 0.535 0.499
Never married 0.334 0.472 0.337 0.473 0.275 0.446
Upper  Secondary education 0.345 0.475 0.341 0.474 0.328 0.469
University education 0.226 0.419 0.223 0.416 0.194 0.395
Out  of labor force 0.443 0.497 0.441 0.497 0.478 0.500
Unemployed 0.044 0.206 0.046 0.208 0.034 0.182
Low  income 0.225 0.417 0.226 0.418 0.256 0.436
Middle  income 0.297 0.457 0.293 0.455 0.296 0.456
Catholic  0.192 0.394 0.176 0.381 0.302 0.459
Protestant 0.068 0.252 0.063 0.243 0.142 0.349
Orthodox 0.093 0.290 0.099 0.299 0.083 0.276
Upper  Secondary, mother 0.195 0.396 0.197 0.397 0.189 0.392
University education, mother 0.104 0.306 0.101 0.301 0.070 0.255
Working mother at age 14 0.560 0.496 0.580 0.494 0.531 0.499
Upper  Secondary, father 0.224 0.417 0.209 0.407 0.222 0.416
University education, father 0.135 0.342 0.134 0.340 0.098 0.298
Working father at age 14 0.854 0.353 0.841 0.366 0.874 0.332
Notes: The immigrant mother sample refers to individuals born in the country of residence and whose mother were born in a different country. The
immigrant father sample refers to individuals born in the country of residence and whose father were born in a different country. The native sample refers
to  individuals born in the country of residence whose mother and father were born in the same country.
Table A2
Countries participating in the ESS by round.
Country Survey round
1 2 3 4 5
Austria X X X
Belgium X X X X X
Bulgaria X X X
Cyprus  X X
Czech  Republic X X X X
Denmark X X X X X
Estonia  X X X X
Finland X X X X X
France  X X X X X
Germany X X X X X
Greece  X X X
Hungary X X X X X
Ireland  X X X X
Israel  X X X
Italy  X X
Luxembourg X X
Netherlands X X X X X
Norway X X X X X
Poland  X X X X X
Portugal X X X X X
Russian Federation X X X
Slovakia X X X
Slovenia X X X X X
Spain  X X X X X
Sweden X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
Turkey  X X
Ukraine X X X
United  Kingdom X X X X X
Note: Edition 1.0 of ESS round 5 is used. Rounds 2 through 5 are used in the analysis.
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Table A3
Countries of ancestry on the mother’s side and summary statistics.
Country
code
Trust, mother’s
country of birth
Count of 2nd
generation
immigrants
Country
code
Trust, mother’s
country of birth
Count of 2nd
generation
immigrants
Country
code
Trust, mother’s
country of birth
Count of 2nd
generation
immigrants
AD 0.207 1 FI 0.565 204 MX  0.241 3
AL  0.256 9 FR 0.219 251 MY  0.088 7
AM  0.247 10 GB 0.359 158 NG 0.219 9
AR  0.196 25 GE 0.185 29 NL 0.506 104
AT  0.327 179 GH 0.085 7 NO 0.664 66
AU  0.446 11 GR 0.237 75 NZ 0.500 4
AZ  0.205 17 GT 0.157 1 PE 0.075 5
BA  0.219 67 HK 0.411 6 PH 0.071 17
BD  0.222 7 HR 0.229 97 PK 0.274 54
BE  0.313 79 HU 0.269 145 PL 0.233 437
BG  0.270 52 ID 0.456 82 PR 0.124 1
BR  0.064 35 IE 0.415 113 PT 0.174 121
BY  0.286 121 IL 0.235 2 RO 0.168 192
CA  0.445 24 IN 0.346 86 RU 0.276 1039
CH  0.438 32 IQ 0.440 147 SE 0.635 63
CL  0.203 14 IR 0.336 70 SG 0.147 2
CN  0.542 12 IS 0.413 8 SI 0.182 7
CO  0.120 4 IT 0.317 472 SK 0.213 180
CS  0.276 47 JO 0.295 4 TH 0.415 10
CSS  0.153 1 JP 0.416 5 TR 0.113 376
CY  0.128 11 KG 0.167 5 TW 0.296 1
CZ  0.267 160 KR 0.317 2 TZ 0.081 2
DE  0.341 666 LT 0.262 34 UA 0.295 255
DK  0.588 51 LU 0.248 14 UG 0.078 1
DO  0.264 2 LV 0.206 31 US 0.411 137
DZ  0.112 115 MA  0.194 365 UY 0.248 8
EE  0.242 17 MD 0.182 19 VE 0.148 5
EG  0.280 56 MK  0.111 28 VN 0.478 13
ES  0.328 142 ML  0.175 3 ZA 0.198 10
ET  0.244 18 MT  0.188 4 ZW 0.112 2
Note: Country codes according to ISO-3166. Trust is measured between 0 and 1, where 1 corresponds to ‘most people can be trusted.’ Country averages
of  trust are computed across the waves in the integrated European Values Survey and World Values Survey. The average across countries is 0.27, and the
standard deviation is 0.135 (both unweighted). The count of 2nd generation immigrants refers to the number of individuals with an immigrant mother in
the  European Social Survey.
Table A4
Demographic estimates in the full and immigrant samples.
Dependent variable: Trust Full sample
(1)
Immigrant
mother
(2)
Immigrant
father
(3)
Age −0.015 −0.019 −0.023
(0.001)*** (0.012) (0.012)*
Age squared/100 0.016 0.024 0.025
(0.001)*** (0.011)** (0.012)**
Female −0.028 −0.012 −0.025
(0.004)*** (0.051) (0.052)
Married 0.128 0.182 0.035
(0.007)*** (0.074)** (0.072)
Never  married 0.231 0.231 0.029
(0.011)*** (0.126)* (0.120)
Upper  secondary 0.205 0.359 0.247
(0.009)*** (0.087)*** (0.093)***
College or university 0.710 0.902 0.958
(0.009)*** (0.091)*** (0.100)***
Out of the labor force −0.079 −0.162 −0.055
(0.014)*** (0.078)** (0.061)
Unemployed −0.368  −0.440 −0.356
(0.014)*** (0.147)*** (0.186)*
Low income −0.269 −0.201 −0.148
(0.006)*** (0.077)** (0.081)*
Middle income 0.006 0.008 −0.007
(0.005) (0.048) (0.056)
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Table  A4 (Continued )
Dependent variable: Trust Full sample
(1)
Immigrant
mother
(2)
Immigrant
father
(3)
Catholic 0.037 −0.065 −0.034
(0.011)*** (0.080) (0.100)
Protestant 0.228 0.289 0.148
(0.019)*** (0.088)*** (0.103)
Orthodox 0.097 0.115 0.127
(0.031)*** (0.168) (0.107)
Constant 4.918 4.888 5.108
(0.046)*** (0.339)*** (0.328)***
Country-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.172 0.126 0.117
Observations 174,857 7235 7535
Notes: The dependent variable Trust is coded from 0, ‘can’t be too careful,’ to 10, ‘most people can be trusted.’ Column (1) includes all observations. Columns
(2)  and (3) includes only second generation immigrants; column (2) study those with an immigrant mother and column (3) those with an immigrant father.
All  regressions include a full set of country of residence-by-year ﬁxed effects. Data is from the second to ﬁfth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard
errors  in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the parent’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table A5
Quantifying the inﬂuence of trust.
Dependent variable: Average net trust difference to natives, by mother’s birth country
(1) (2)
Trust, mother’s birth country 1.447 1.040
(0.392)*** (0.327)***
log(gdp), mother’s birth country 0.057
(0.053)
Polity2, mother’s birth country −0.002
(0.006)
Women’s LFP, mother’s birth country −0.179
(0.185)
Women’s education, mother’s birth
country
1.008
(0.283)***
Constant −0.358 −0.949
(0.114)*** (0.473)**
R-squared 0.236 0.361
Number of countries 76 76
Notes: The dependent variable average net trust differences to natives are the country ﬁxed effects from a regression of trust on individual characteristics
and  country ﬁxed effects among second generation immigrants with an immigrant mother. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education,
labor  force attachment, income, and religious denomination. Polity2 is increasing the more democratic political institutions are, LFP measures labor force
participations of women, and education is measured by the fraction with a tertiary degree. Regressions are weighted by number of second generation
immigrants from each ancestral country. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the mother’s birth country.
Signiﬁcance stars
*
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
Dp < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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